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Combining a Renewable Portfolio Standard with a  
Cap-and-Trade Policy: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
Jennifer F. Morris
1
, John M. Reilly and Sergey Paltsev 
Abstract 
Many efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions combine a cap-and-trade system with other 
measures such as a renewable portfolio standard. In this paper we use a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, to 
investigate the effects of combining these policies. We find that adding an RPS requiring 20 percent 
renewables by 2020 to a cap that reduces emissions by 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 increases the 
net present value welfare cost of meeting such a cap by 25 percent over the life of the policy, while 
reducing the CO2-equivalent price by about 20 percent each year. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most economists see incentive-based measures such as a cap-and-trade system or an 
emissions tax as cost-effective instruments for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (for 
example, Baumol and Oates, 1988; Tietenberg, 1990; Stavins, 1997; Palmer and Burtraw, 2005; 
Dobesova et al., 2005). In actuality, many efforts to address GHG emissions combine a cap-and-
trade system with regulatory instruments, such as a renewable portfolio standard (RPS). 
Examples include the European Union’s 20-20-20 goal and the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 
2454) passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009. Here we investigate how a 
renewable portfolio standard (RPS) interacts with a cap-and-trade policy.  
To do this, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. An advantage of such a 
model is that it captures all of the interactions and ripple effects throughout the economy. We use 
the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, which was developed to 
evaluate the impact of energy and environmental policies on global economic and energy 
systems, and augment it to better represent renewable electricity technologies. 
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A renewable portfolio standard (also called a renewable electricity standard or RES) is a 
policy that requires that a minimum amount of electricity come from renewable energy sources, 
such as wind, solar, and biomass. Most commonly the RPS is in terms of percentage of 
electricity sold, as capacity- and production-based requirements do not ensure that renewable 
electricity is actually produced and used. The energy sources qualifying as ―renewable‖ to meet 
the standard can vary. Wind, solar (solar thermal and photovoltaic), biomass, and geothermal are 
generally always eligible. Hydroelectricity may or may not be eligible. A commonly proposed 
rule is that existing hydroelectric generation does not count, but incremental new hydroelectricity 
does (EIA, 2007). Municipal solid waste and landfill gas are sometimes included. Some argue 
that the standard should be expanded to a low-carbon portfolio standard, including technologies 
like nuclear, coal plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS), or even, as is the case in 
Pennsylvania, integrated coal gasification combined cycle plants without CCS, but almost none 
of the existing RPS policies or proposals consider these technologies eligible.
2
   
Many RPS programs utilize tradable renewable electricity certificates (RECs) to increase the 
flexibility and reduce the cost of meeting the target. A REC is created when a specified amount 
(e.g. kilowatt-hour or megawatt-hour) of renewable electricity is generated, and it can be traded 
separately from the underlying electricity generation. REC transactions create a second source of 
revenue for renewable generators, which functions like a subsidy. RECs also offer flexibility to 
retail suppliers by allowing them to comply by either directly purchasing renewable electricity or 
by purchasing RECs. Banking and borrowing of RECs may also be allowed for flexibility.  
Renewables have generally not been well represented in macroeconomic models because the 
variability of the resource is not captured. We reformulate the representation of renewables to 
include the need for back-up generation capacity when the renewable resource is not available.  
We then develop a system that allows REC trading within the model.  We then use the revised 
model to investigate the role and cost of an RPS requirement as part of a broader GHG reduction 
policy. 
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the CGE model we use, and how 
we modified it to better represent renewable technologies and to implement an RPS requirement. 
Section 3 assesses the impacts of an RPS policy, both alone and combined with a cap-and-trade 
policy, and considers the sensitivity of the results to the costs and availability of generating 
technologies. In Section 4 we offer some conclusions. 
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 Another RPS design option is ―tiered‖ targets. Tiered targets establish different sets of targets and timetables for 
different renewable technologies (for example, one target for solar and another for wind and biomass). The 
purpose of tiers is to ensure that an RPS provides support to not just the least-cost renewable energy options, but 
also to other ―preferred‖ resources such as solar power (DeCarolis and Keith, 2006). This design option would 
tend to make compliance with the target more expensive by mandating technologies other than the least-cost 
renewables.  
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2. ANALYSIS METHOD 
2.1 The Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model 
 The EPPA model is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive-dynamic representation of the 
global economy (Paltsev et al., 2005). The level of aggregation of the model is presented in 
Table 1. Non-energy activities are aggregated to seven sectors, and the energy sector is modeled 
in more detail. All production sectors of the economy interact through a full input-output 
structure. The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural gas. The oil 
shale industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. Electricity generation technologies 
produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for renewables which are modeled as producing 
an imperfect substitute. The electricity generation technologies in red are new additions to the 
model from this work, and the basis for including this reformulation is discussed below. Biomass 
use is included both in electric generation and in transport where a liquid fuel is produced that is 
assumed to be a perfect substitute for refined oil.    
Table 1. EPPA Model Details. 
Country or Region
†
  Sectors Factors 
Developed Final Demand Sectors Capital  
   United States (USA) Agriculture  Labor  
   Canada (CAN) Services  Crude Oil Resources 
   Japan (JPN) Energy-Intensive Products  Natural Gas Resources 
   European Union+ (EUR) Other Industries Products  Coal Resources 
   Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Transportation  Shale Oil Resources 
   Former Soviet Union (FSU) Household Transportation  Nuclear Resources 
   Eastern Europe (EET) Other Household Demand Hydro Resources 
Developing Energy Supply & Conversion Wind/Solar Resources 
   India (IND)  Electric Generation Land 
   China (CHN)     Conventional Fossil   
   Indonesia (IDZ)      Hydro   
   Higher Income East Asia
 
(ASI)      Nuclear   
   Mexico (MEX)      Wind, Solar   
   Central & South America (LAM)      Biomass   
   Middle East (MES)      Advanced Gas (NGCC)   
   Africa (AFR)      Advanced Gas with CCS   
   Rest of World (ROW)       Advanced Coal with CCS   
      Wind with Gas Backup  
         Wind with Biomass Backup   
   Fuels  
      Coal  
       Crude Oil, Shale Oil, Refined Oil   
      Natural Gas, Gas from Coal  
      Liquids from Biomass  
       Synthetic Gas    
† 
Specific detail on regional groupings is provided in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
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The model includes representation of abatement of CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gas 
emissions (CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) and the calculations consider both the emissions 
mitigation that occurs as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2 and reductions resulting from 
gas-specific control measures. Targeted control measures include reductions in the emissions of: 
CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels; the industrial gases that replace CFCs controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol and produced at aluminum smelters; CH4 from fossil energy production and 
use, agriculture, and waste; and N2O from fossil fuel combustion, chemical production and 
improved fertilizer use. More detail on how abatement costs are represented for these substances 
is provided in Hyman et al. (2003).  
2.2 Representing Renewables and Renewable Policy 
Renewables were represented in the EPPA model as an imperfect substitute for other 
electricity to reflect the intermittency of the resource and variability in supply from better and 
more easily accessible sites to those where the resource was less dependable and more remote. A 
well-known property of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function used is that it is 
share-preserving, thus tending to limit renewable penetration to not much beyond initial shares.  
In fact, the amount of fairly high quality wind is not a limiting factor in the U.S. The main issue 
is intermittency and in some cases remoteness, but this can be overcome with new transmission 
and either back-up capacity or through effective storage. High volume and relatively long-term 
battery storage is not currently practical, and even pumped hydro and compressed air energy 
storage appear fairly expensive. Hence we chose to represent these technologies as requiring 
backup capacity.   
We add two new renewable backstop technologies: large scale wind with natural gas backup 
and large scale wind with biomass backup. They are modeled as perfect substitutes for other 
electricity because the backup makes up for intermittency. The additional costs for large scale 
wind (transmission and backup or storage) are incorporated into the costs of the new 
technologies. This represents in our model the real cost of the variable resource, and findings that 
natural gas generation capacity is crucial for the operation of a large-scale wind system (e.g. 
Decarolis and Keith, 2006). For these technologies, we follow a convention of specifying a CES 
production function that requires specification of cost shares of each input.  
We distinguish between renewables at low penetration levels and at large scale. For low 
penetration rates we retain the specification of renewables as an imperfect substitute for 
conventional electricity (Paltsev et al., 2005). This specification allows expansion of existing 
renewables with gradually increasing costs of integrating variable resources into the 
conventional grid. To represent the possibility of greater renewable penetration, we add the two 
new wind technologies where backup capacity is required with installation of the renewable 
generation capacity.  The backup capacity allows the renewable source to be dispatched as 
needed, utilizing the backup capacity to make up for the variability of the renewable resource.  
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Table 2. Cost Calculation of Electricity from Various Sources. 
  
Units 
Pulverized 
Coal 
Solar 
Thermal 
Solar 
PV 
Wind Biomass NGCC 
Wind 
Plus 
Biomass 
Backup  
[1] 
Wind 
Plus Gas 
Backup 
[1] 
"Overnight" Capital Cost  $/kW 2058 5021 6038 1923 3766 948 5689 2871 
Capital Recovery Charge  % 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Fixed O&M $/kW 27.5 56.78 11.68 30 64.5 11.7 94.5 41.7 
Variable O&M $/kWh 0.0045 0 0 0 0.0067 0.002 0.0067 0.002 
Project Life Years 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Capacity Factor % 85 35 26 35 80 85 42 42 
(Capacity Factor Wind) %             35 35 
(Capacity Factor Biomass/NGCC) %             7 7 
Operating Hours Hours 7446 3066 2277.6 3066 7008 7446 3679.2 3679.2 
Capital Recovery Required $/kWh 0.02 0.14 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.07 
Fixed O&M Recovery Required $/kWh 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Heat Rate BTU/kWh 9200 0 0 0 9646 6752 9646 6752 
Fuel Cost $/MMBTU 1 0 0 0 1 4 1 4 
(Fraction Biomass/NGCC) %             8.8 8.2 
Fuel Cost per kWh $/kWh 0.0092 0 0 0 0.0096 0.0270 0.001 0.0022 
Levelized Cost of Electricity $/kWh 0.041 0.158 0.231 0.063 0.071 0.041 0.165 0.082 
Transmission and Distribution  $/kWh 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Cost of Electricity $/kWh 0.061 0.178 0.251 0.083 0.091 0.061 0.195 0.112 
Cost Relative to Coal   1.00 2.92 4.11 1.36 1.50 1.01 3.20 1.84 
          
[1] A combined wind and biomass plant (or wind and gas plant) assumes that there is 1 KW installed capacity of biomass (gas) for every 1 KW 
installed capacity of wind, and assumes the wind plant has a capacity factor of 35% and the biomass (gas) plant has a capacity factor of 7%, 
operating only as needed to eliminate the variability of the wind resource. 
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Cost details and the levelized cost estimates for renewable and other generation technologies 
are provided in Table 2, including in the final line the cost relative to pulverized coal generation. 
Overnight capital and fixed and variable operation and maintenance (O&M) costs were taken 
from EIA data (2009), as were heat rates. Capacity factors for the traditional plants and fuel costs 
were taken from a study conducted by Lazard Ltd. (Lazard, 2008). The capital recovery rate of 
8.5% was calculated as the rate that gives the constant capital recovery necessary each year over 
the life of the plant in order to recover capital costs, taking into account discounting, and is 
consistent with Stauffer (2006).  
For the wind with backup technologies, we assume that for every KW installed capacity of 
wind one KW of installed capacity of the backup (either gas or biomass) is required.  Reflecting 
typical load curves and wind generation curves, we assume the capacity factor for the backup is 
7 percent and that of the wind portion of the installation is 35 percent.  Thus, about 17 percent of 
the electricity produced is from the backup and 83 percent is from wind. Capital, O&M and fuel 
costs of a wind plant are combined with those of a gas or biomass plant in the levelized cost 
calculation for wind with backup. The cost of transmission and distribution (T&D) for 
conventional sources is estimated at $0.02 per kWh (McFarland et al., 2002), and we add an 
extra $0.01 for large scale wind with backup to account for transmission from ideal wind sites 
that are often some distance from load.  The resulting costs relative to coal generation are shown 
in the final row of the Table 2. 
We follow Paltsev et al. (2005) and model the initially limited capacity for the construction of 
new technologies with an initial endowment of a technology-specific fixed factor that increases 
as a function of installed capacity. This creates short-run adjustment costs that slow the rate of 
installation in early periods. The data in Table 2, along with the fixed factor, allow for the 
calculation of input cost shares, which are used in EPPA. The CES nest structure and input cost 
shares are shown in Figure 1 for wind with gas backup and wind with biomass backup (in 
parentheses). The elasticity of substitution between wind and the backup technology is zero 
(Leontief), reflecting the requirement of complete back-up.  
We implement the RPS by requiring that each unit of conventional electricity submit 
renewable electricity credits (RECs) in proportion to the RPS constraint as an additional input to 
production. RECs are produced jointly with the renewable electricity, as shown in Figure 1. If 
the RPS is 20%, the production of every unit of conventional electricity requires 0.2 RECs. Wind 
with biomass backup is considered fully renewable so each unit of generation also produces one 
REC. However, wind with gas backup only produces 0.83 of a REC with each unit of generation 
because only 83 percent of electricity is from wind and the remaining 17 percent is from gas 
which does not qualify as renewable. The gas is also subject to any carbon policy, and carbon 
permits or a carbon tax payment covering the amount of gas used must accompany production 
from wind with gas backup.  
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Figure 1. Production Function for Wind with Backup Technologies. 
Note: Cost share parameters are shown beneath the inputs for wind with gas backup, and in 
parentheses for wind with biomass backup. K----. and L---- are capital and labor, respectively, for 
the wind generation or for the backup; σj are elasticities of substitution, j indicating the different 
nests; electricity (ELEC) and renewable electricity credits (REC) are joint outputs. The dashed-line 
nest with land as an input applies only to biomass backup. The dotted-line nest, with gas and 
carbon permit, applies only to gas backup.  
3. ECONOMICS OF RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
To explore the economics of renewable portfolio standards we focus on policies in the U.S. In 
particular, this work focuses on a cap-and-trade policy of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.
3
 This 
core case is labeled as 167 bmt, which is the cumulative number of allowances made available 
between 2012 and 2050 in billions of metric tons (bmt), or gigatons, of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2-e) emissions.
4
  
Throughout this analysis the cap covers the emissions of the six categories of greenhouse 
gases identified in U.S. policy statements and in the Kyoto Protocol (CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, HFCs, 
and PFCs), with the gases aggregated at the 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP) rates 
used in US EPA (2006). All prices are thus CO2-equivalent prices (noted CO2-e), and are in 2005 
dollars. Banking and borrowing are allowed, the cap applies to all sectors of the economy except 
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For analysis of the cost of the Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454) see Appendix C to Paltsev et al. (2009).  
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 A complete set of results for this scenario and two other core scenarios and for variation in system features over 
such dimensions as coverage, banking and borrowing, trade restrictions, revenue recycling, and agricultural 
markets is provided in Paltsev et al. (2008). Paltsev et al. (2009) also provides analysis focusing on the 167 bmt 
case. 
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emissions from land use, and no credits for CO2 sequestration by forests or soils are included. 
The policy scenarios provide no possibility for crediting reductions achieved in systems outside 
of the U.S., such as the Kyoto-sanctioned Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or other 
trading systems such as the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS).
5
  
 3.1 Impact of RPS Policy 
3.1.1 General  RPS  
Next we utilize the new RPS constraint to test the impact of RPS policies. We simulated 
general RPS policies that require either 5, 10, 15 or 20% renewables each year from 2015 to 
2050. In this set of scenarios, a 20% RPS would start in 2015 requiring 20% renewables and 
would have that same requirement until 2050. There are only slight variations in the emissions 
paths for the various levels of RPS added to the 167 bmt cap-and-trade, which are due to 
differences in banking as it interacts with the RPS. All cases show net banking, with GHG 
emissions below allowances in early years and exceeding allowances in later ones. By design, all 
cases meet the 167 bmt cumulative cap for the period 2012 to 2050. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of adding the various levels of RPS requirements to the 167 bmt 
cap-and-trade policy on welfare change and CO2-e price in 2030. In the figure 0% RPS is the 167 
bmt cap only. As the level of RPS added to the cap-and-trade policy increases, the welfare loss 
increases. Comparing the no RPS case to the 20% RPS, welfare loss increases from less than 1% 
to nearly 1.7%, representing about a 70% increase in cost.  Beyond 2030, the difference in 
welfare change due to the RPS level decreases because there has been significant time to adjust 
to the policy and make investments in renewable technologies that bring down costs in the later 
years. As the figure shows, an RPS combined with a cap-and-trade policy achieves the same 
emissions as a cap-and-trade only policy but at a greater cost.  
Alternatively, as the level of RPS added to the cap increases, the CO2-e price decreases. The 
price is 107/tCO2-e under the cap-and-trade alone and $85/tCO2-e under the cap with a 20% 
RPS. This represents a 21% decrease in price. While the CO2-e price can be a general indicator 
of the strength and cost of a greenhouse gas mitigation policy, if that policy combines cap-and-
trade with other policies then the CO2-e price can be a misleading indicator of the amount of 
emissions controlled and the total cost of the policy. In this case, for a fixed GHG reduction 
CO2-e prices are lower the larger the RPS. On the other hand, the total cost to the economy, 
measured as change in welfare, is larger the larger the RPS, with no gain in emissions reductions. 
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convention of the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) (Clarke et al., 2009) and specify the following policies: 
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a linear path to 50% below their 2030 emissions level by 2070; and the rest of the countries delay action beyond 
the 2050 horizon of our study. There is no emissions trading among regions.  
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Figure 2. Impact of Various Levels of RPS Targets Added to a 167 bmt Cap-and-Trade 
Policy: (a) Welfare Change in 2030 and (b) CO2-e Price in 2030. 
 
 We illustrate the effect of the RPS on CO2-e prices using a hypothetical marginal abatement 
cost (MAC) curve. In Figure 3a the MAC without RPS represents a cap-and-trade only policy: a 
target (the cap) is set for a specific amount of emissions reductions. The resulting CO2-e price 
(PCap) is where the cap meets the MAC curve. The MAC with RPS represents a cap-and-trade 
policy with the addition of a binding RPS. The additional renewables required beyond that which 
the cap-and-trade would bring forth creates a horizontal shift of the MAC curve to the right, by 
the amount of carbon reduced by the additional renewables. The shifted curve now results in a 
lower CO2-e price (PCap+RPS).  
Turning to the full cost of the RPS, Figure 3b demonstrates the general impact of the RPS on 
the electricity market under marginal cost pricing of electricity, and assuming a constant returns 
to scale conventional generation technology. Mandating more renewables increases the price of 
electricity, reducing the total quantity of electricity demanded and the amount of fossil 
electricity. Area A+B+C+D represents the loss in consumer surplus because of the higher 
electricity price. Area A is the gain to renewable producers due to the RPS. Area C is the gain to 
remaining fossil producers who receive the higher electricity price. This leaves area B+D as 
deadweight loss from the RPS policy—area B is loss from inefficient production (forcing more 
expensive renewables instead of cheaper fossil production) and area D is loss from lower 
consumption due to the higher price.  
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Figure 3a. MAC Curves with and without an RPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Impacts of an RPS Policy with Marginal Cost Pricing of Electricity. A: gain to 
producers of renewable electricity, B: deadweight loss, C: gain to producers of fossil-
based electricity, D: deadweight loss, A+B+C+D: reduction in consumer surplus. 
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 As noted, the illustrated case is for marginal cost pricing. Markets for electricity distribution 
are regulated and so consumers would not see a rate that reflected the marginal cost of 
renewables but rather a cost that averaged in the marginal cost of renewables, reflected in a 
RECs market.  Using terms from Figure 3b, a representation of this pricing structure is:  
     
                       
   
      
    
Where P
AC 
is the average cost price of electricity, P
rps
 is the marginal cost of renewable 
electricity and P is the (constant) marginal cost of fossil electricity. Only the change in Qrenew 
matters as the original amount of renewables is already rolled into the marginal cost in the 
market outcome. Consider an example where at the market price (P) renewables make up 5% of 
total electricity. An RPS target of 15% increases the share of renewables by 10%. If at       
   
 
renewables are 40% more expensive than fossil electricity, the electricity price would increase by 
4% (.10*.40) under average cost pricing, instead of the full 40% in full marginal cost pricing. In 
relation to Figure 3b, this is a smaller price increase so area D loss would be smaller due to less 
reduced demand, area C would be much less implying less transfer from consumers to producers, 
and area B loss would be the same size. The EPPA model assumes marginal cost pricing which 
tends to have a greater price response but also a greater carbon response due to a larger decrease 
in fossil electricity demand. 
3.1.2 Phased in RPS 
To provide further insight into policy options more similar to those being considered in the 
U.S., we consider an RPS that is phased in. We represent an RPS with targets of 9.5% in 2015 
and 20% in 2020 to 2050. To help put these RPS targets into context, it is helpful to look at the 
penetration of renewables under business as usual assumptions. Today in the U.S., renewables 
are responsible for roughly 3% of electricity production, according to EIA data. The model used 
in this analysis predicts the non-hydroelectric renewable share under business as usual to be 
around 3%, falling somewhat in later years as other generation sources expand more rapidly to 
meet growing demand. This result is similar to other studies. For example, Palmer and Burtraw 
(2005), using the Haiku electricity market model, have a baseline forecast of generation by non-
hydro renewables of 3.1% of total generation by 2020.  
Figure 4 shows the GHG emissions paths for the 167 bmt cap-and-trade only policy, the RPS 
alone according to the targets described above, and the combination of the cap and RPS. The 
RPS alone does not significantly reduce emissions, and results in 308 bmt cumulative emissions 
over the course of the policy. The cap alone and the cap with the RPS both result in 167 bmt 
cumulative emissions.   
Combining the RPS with the cap results in higher welfare costs than the cap alone (see Figure 
5). Even though the RPS is phased in, it is more binding in early years, with substantially higher 
welfare costs through about 2035. In later years the RPS is no longer binding and welfare 
changes are similar for the cap alone and the cap with RPS. This happens because the rapid 
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increase in the requirement creates additional short term adjustment costs that disappear as this 
capacity expansion constraint becomes less binding.  However, because of the larger welfare 
losses in early years, the net present value (NPV) of welfare cost of this combined RPS and cap 
policy is worse than a cap alone. The NPV of welfare change over the policy period is -1.16% 
for the cap alone and -1.44% for the cap with the RPS. This represents a 25% cost increase as a 
result of adding the RPS to the cap-and-trade. This means that adding an RPS to a cap achieves 
the same amount of emissions reductions but at significantly greater costs. The RPS alone has a 
NPV of welfare change of -0.71%, which is costly considering how few emissions reductions it 
achieves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. GHG Emissions Paths. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Impact of Different Policies: (a) Welfare Change and (b) CO2-e Price. 
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Although adding the RPS to the cap increases the welfare cost, it decreases the CO2-e price 
(see Figure 5). With the cap alone the price starts at about $60 per ton CO2-e in 2015 and rises to 
$235 per ton CO2-e in 2050. When the RPS is added to the cap the initial 2015 price is reduced 
to $48 per ton CO2-e and rises to about $191 per ton CO2-e in 2050, a reduction of about 19%.  
Figure 6 compares the electricity generation by source of the reference, cap only, cap plus 
RPS, and RPS only cases. Wind with backup and other renewables together achieve the RPS 
target. Adding the RPS to the cap reduces generation by coal and natural gas. The RPS requires 
that these cheaper generation sources be replaced by more expensive renewables. In the cap 
alone, renewables are only about 3% of generation in all years. Natural gas combined cycle 
(NGCC) and reducing electricity use are determined to be the most cost-effective strategies for 
reducing emissions. In the cases with an RPS, other renewables ramp up in early years to meet 
the renewables target. However, as the target becomes more stringent wind with backup 
(particularly gas backup) becomes more cost-effective than the other renewables. This occurs 
because there is an increasing penalty on other renewables as they increase as a percentage of 
total generation (because of assumptions about intermittency discussed in Section 2.2). In the 
case of the RPS only policy, coal use is still significant as the policy is not stringent enough to 
further reduce coal generation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Electricity Generation by Source: (a) Reference (b) 167 bmt, (c) 167 bmt with 
RPS, and (d) RPS Only. 
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For the cap with RPS, renewables actually expand beyond the 20% required by the RPS, 
rising to almost 40% of total electricity in 2050. This happens because in earlier years the RPS 
required the development of wind with backup. This increased the level of fixed factor in later 
years, lowering the adjustment costs at a time when renewables are becoming more economic 
relative to fossil technologies due to the increasing CO2-e price. Thus by the later years of the 
policy it is more cost-effective to continue to expand renewables with backup than to start to 
develop CCS, expand NGCC, or further reduce use.  
3.2 Sensitivity 
To test the sensitivity of the results above to the technology and cost assumptions made, we 
created three additional scenarios with different assumptions. In the first scenario case, the cost 
of CCS technologies is decreased (case denoted ―low ccs cost‖). For coal with CCS and gas with 
CCS the cost relative to conventional coal generation is decreased from 1.6 and 1.6 to 1.19 and 
1.17, respectively. In the past CCS was thought to be less expensive than current assessments 
and it is possible that developments take place that reduce cost estimates once again. In the 
second and third cases, the cost of all renewable technologies are increased by 25% (cases 
denoted ―high renew cost‖) and decreased by 25% (case denoted ―low renew cost‖). These cases 
explore the situations in which renewables cost more or less than expected.  
For the cap with RPS policy, coal with CCS dominates after 2030 when CCS costs are low. 
With high renewable costs, the electricity mix is very similar to that of the base cap plus RPS 
case, except renewables do not expand beyond the required target in 2050 because they are so 
expensive. With low renewable costs, renewables are very cost effective and expand well beyond 
their RPS requirement starting in 2035. In 2035 renewables are 45% of total electricity and 
increase to 72% by 2050.  This case implies the importance of bringing down the cost of large 
scale renewable technologies.  
 Figure 7 compares the welfare changes in the base case and sensitivity cases for the cap with 
RPS policy. The low CCS cost results in lower welfare costs. Because the RPS forces a 
significant percentage of renewables, the high renewable cost case significantly increases the 
welfare cost. Alternatively, the low renewable cost significantly decreases the welfare cost. For 
the RPS only, the same pattern emerges except the low CCS cost does not make a difference 
because an RPS alone policy does not bring in CCS. Of course, the cost of renewables drastically 
affects the cost of meeting a policy involving an RPS. In the case of a cap alone, the low CCS 
cost reduces welfare cost even more relative to the base case. The high renewable cost does not 
affect the welfare compared to the base case because the cap alone uses only small quantities of 
renewables. The low renewable cost brings large amounts of renewables into the cap only case 
and reduces welfare costs slightly compared to the base.  
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Figure 7. Welfare Change for 167 bmt with RPS. 
In terms of NPV welfare costs over the whole period, when an RPS is added to a cap the cost 
of the policy significantly increases. The NPV cost of the policy increases by 25% in the base 
case, 39% in the low CCS cost case, 48% in the high renewable cost case, and 4% in the low 
renewable cost case. These large increases in costs are a result of the RPS policy preventing the 
use of least-cost options and instead forcing the use of renewables, regardless of their cost. 
Without the RPS, the cap alone has the flexibility to meet the 167 bmt target with the most cost-
effective technologies. Adding the RPS to the cap removes this flexibility, which proves 
immensely costly when renewables turn out to be more expensive than expected. This point 
highlights a key problem with an RPS: it picks technology winners that may not prove to be the 
best or cheapest. A cap alone does not pick winners, but provides incentives to develop the 
technologies that can meet the cap in the most cost-effective way. NGCC and reduced use are the 
most cost-effective way in the base case. If CCS is cheaper, that is more cost-effective. If 
renewables are less expensive, or perhaps if NGCC turns out to be more expensive, then 
renewables would enter as a cost-effective way to meet the cap.  
Different technology cost assumptions also impact the CO2-e prices (see Figure 8). Compared 
to the base case, low renewable costs reduce the CO2-e price for both the cap alone and cap with 
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of the policy. Even though the welfare costs are much higher with the high renewable costs, the 
CO2-e price is almost the same.  
 
Figure 8. CO2-e Prices. 
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the 20% RPS to the cap-and-trade policy increases the NPV welfare cost by 25 percent over the 
life of the policy. At the same time, the addition of the RPS reduces the CO2-e price by about 20 
percent each year, thereby hiding the additional welfare costs.  
When phasing in the RPS, it is more binding in early years, but no longer binding in later 
years. There is a benefit of the RPS because capacity expansion in early years increases the level 
of fixed factor in later years when renewables become economic. As a result renewables face 
lower adjustment costs in later years. However, because of the large welfare losses in early years, 
the NPV of welfare cost of this combined RPS and cap policy is still worse than a cap alone.  
Using different technology and cost assumptions increase or decrease the cost of the policies. 
When renewables are 25% more expensive, adding an RPS to a cap increases the cost of the 
policy over the whole period by 48%. This highlights a key issue with an RPS: it picks 
technology winners regardless of their cost-effectiveness. An RPS shifts investment away from 
the least-cost emission reduction options and toward these specific renewable technologies, 
which are not necessarily least-cost or even low-cost. Thus, by removing the flexibility to pursue 
the least costly emission reduction strategy, an RPS adds to the economy-wide cost of the policy. 
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